

# Introduction to the GST Security Architecture


Danny De Cock  
SEVECOM Workshop  
4-5 September 2006  
Budapest, Hungary



# SEC Goal

- **Define an architecture and provide security mechanisms for secure telematics applications**
  - ◆ **Functional point of view**
    - Applications, services, user devices...
  - ◆ **Infrastructure point of view (networks, platforms)**

# Security – Where?




## User Requirements:





- “I do not want to pay for services I did not order/use”
  - Authentication and Non-repudiation
- “I do not want that unauthorized parties are able to monitor what I do”
  - Privacy and confidentiality

# Security – How?

Based on implementation complexity and cost:


- No security mechanisms
- Non-cryptographic techniques (e.g., CRC, hardware enclosures,...)
- Combine all of the above with cryptographic techniques



Security Levels		Protect Confidentiality	
		Yes	No
Protect Integrity	Yes	<b>Secure</b> 	<b>Authenticated</b> 
	No	<b>Confidential</b> 	<b>Insecure</b> 


# Security – What?

- User/Services data
  - ◆ User requests service
    - Information and data exchange
  - ◆ Service provider provides service
    - Client-server model
- Application data
  - ◆ Sent between service provider and device



# SEC Impact

- Reference points follow a layered model



{Device, Infrastructure} →

{Infrastructure, Device}



### Device A

#### Applications

Provides functionality to user  
Uses services from remote devices  
Provides services to remote devices

#### Secure Communications Engine

Send (Target, Security Level, Data)  
Process (Incoming Data)

#### Communications Engine

Send (Target, Data)  
Listener (Incoming Data)

### Device B

#### Applications


Provides functionality to user  
Uses services from remote devices  
Provides services to remote devices

#### Secure Communications Engine

Send (Target, Security Level, Data)  
Process (Incoming Data)


#### Communications Engine

Send (Target, Data)  
Listener (Incoming Data)




# GST High-level Architecture

- Entities






# SEC Entities/Actors




# Security Aware GST Entity

- Has an authorization broker
  - ◆ Validates whether certain actions can be allowed, e.g., incoming network traffic, software update,...
- Has an authentication broker
  - ◆ Validates authenticity of other GST entities and End users
  - ◆ Authenticates data sent from this entity to another GST player
- Includes a security module
  - ◆ Stores the entity's credentials (e.g., session keys, trusted certificates,...)
  - ◆ Protects confidentiality and/or integrity of persistently stored data (e.g., log files, user data, system data,...)




# SEC Decomposed Entities



# Devices and Security Modules

## Key Features of a Security Module:



- One SM per Device
- SM = e.g., OSGi bundle
- SM offers services to other bundles
- SM initialized by manufacturer
- Initialized SM ready to be used
- Combination of hard- and software
  - Hardware → Non-cloneable
  - Software → Risk for cloning
- Provide true strong authentication
- Secure communications rely on SM
  - Insecure
  - Authenticity
  - Confidentiality
  - Secure = Auth. + Conf.
  - Optionally: Anonymous




# SM Functionality

- Access-controlled/Secure persistent storage engine
  - ◆ User data, Communications session data
- Authentication engine
  - ◆ Digitally sign outgoing information
  - ◆ Calculate Message Authentication Code (MACs)
  - ◆ Verify incoming authenticated data
- System-wide “trusted” information
  - ◆ Root CA certificates
  - ◆ Trust anchors with respect to registration proofs
- Operates in client-server mode
  - ◆ Difficult to enforce use of security module at client side
  - ◆ Server can determine whether the correct SM was used



# Secure Communications



# Secure Communication Types



# Secure Key Agreement with Station-to-Station





# Thank you for your attention

Danny De Cock

[Danny.DeCock@esat.kuleuven.be](mailto:Danny.DeCock@esat.kuleuven.be)

<http://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic>

GST – Global System for Telematics

<http://www.gstforum.org>

“If it is provably secure, it is probably not...” – Lars R. Knudsen on block ciphers

# Secure Key Agreement with Station-to-Station (ctd)



Ping message sent from D1 to D2

- Computes secret  $x$
- Calculates  $\alpha^x$
- Authenticates  $\{data_1 || \alpha^x\}$



D1 Broadcasts the Ping message

- Broadcast of Authenticated  $(data_1 || \alpha^x)$

D2 Receives a Ping message

- Checks Authenticated  $(data_1 || \alpha^x)$
- Processes  $data_1$



D2 Prepares a Pong message for D1

- Computes secret  $y$
- Calculates  $\alpha^y$
- Calculates  $K = (\alpha^x)^y$
- Encrypts data:  $E_K(data_2)$
- Authenticates  $\{E_K(data_2) || \alpha^y\}$



D2 Broadcasts Pong message for D1

- Broadcast of Authenticated  $(E_K(data_2) || \alpha^y)$

D1 Receives a Pong message

- Checks Authenticated  $(E_K(data_2) || \alpha^y)$
- Calculates  $K = (\alpha^y)^x$
- Decrypts  $E_K(data_2)$
- Processes  $data_2$



D1 Prepares Secure Data Transfer

- Encrypts  $E_K(data_3)$
- Authenticates  $E_K(data_3)$



D1 Broadcasts Secured Data Transfer message for D2

- Broadcast of Authenticated  $(E_K(data_3))$

D2 Receives a Secured Data Transfer message


- Checks Authenticated  $(E_K(data_3))$

D2 Decrypts the information within a session with D1


- Decrypts  $E_K(data_3)$




# Devices Registration




# Pushing Data to Car




- Information is sent to a vehicle
- Vehicle gateway determines information origin
- If “trusted”, information routed to intended destination
- Registration proofs are crucial to build trust
  - ◆ Determine whether a device in a car belongs to that car



# Pulling Data to Car




- In-car service requests Car Gateway to send a request to a remote Service Provider
- Service Provider determines request origin
- Authorized request is processed
- Response is authenticated and sent to requestor if applicable
- Allows proving who used a specific service, e.g., for billing



# Examples of Security Modules

- **Hardware security module (most expensive)**
  - ◆ Used for high-bandwidth communications, secure payments, etc.
  - ◆ Not very car-friendly ☺
- **Smartcard, SecurID token, SIM card**
  - ◆ Commonly used to provide strong authentication
  - ◆ Reasonably cheap
- **Trusted platform module (TPM)**
  - ◆ By default built into many new laptops and desktops
  - ◆ Cheap
- **Software key store (cheapest)**
  - ◆ Less critical applications

# Relation with Trusted Computing



# Protocol Stacks View

